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Article 6

Comment

Criminal Copyright Infringement
and a Step Beyond: 17 U.S.C. § 506
(1976)t
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution explicitly confers upon Congress the power
[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."' Pursuant to this grant
of authority, Congress enacted various statutes to define the rights
and scope of protection to be afforded to authors. The basic notion
underlying these statutes, the copyright laws, is that authors
should control the right to reproduce their own works. Traditionally, a copyright infringement-a violation of the exclusive statutory rights provided to a copyrighted work-has been redressable
under these federal statutes in a civil action for damages or equitable relief.2 It has only been within the last century that Congress
has seen fit to expand the sanctions
for copyright infringement by
3
providing criminal penalties.
Although generally available for use since 1909,4 federal crimit

1.
2.

3.
4.

This essay was awarded first prize in the 1980 Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition at the University of Nebraska College of Law, and is entered in
the National Competition, which is sponsored by the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
From the very beginning of federal copyright, civil remedies have provided
the foundation for the protection of authors' rights in their works. See Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). As the date of this Act indicates,
matters relating to copyright have been the subject of federal legislation
since the initial session of the United States Congress. The 1790 Congress
passed "[a] n Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of
maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during
the times therein mentioned." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
This act was followed by many others, expanding and redefining the scope of
copyright protection to achieve the present federal copyright laws found at 17
U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976).
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). Section 28
of the 1909 Act is reprinted in note 23 infra.
Some limited criminal infringement provisions did exist prior to 1909. See,
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nal copyright provisions were seldom invoked by the government
until the 1970's. Several reasons have been offered for this lack of
prosecution. First, very little legislative history existed to aid attorneys and the courts in interpreting the criminal copyright provisions. This fact, coupled with the traditional hesitancy of
lawyers to "sample unploughed linguistic ground," 5 may have
caused prosecutors to shy away from attempts to employ the criminal sanctions. Another reason offered for the paucity of criminal
copyright prosecutions was the belief that federal civil remedies,
including statutory damages, 6 provided sufficient punishment to
copyright infringers. 7 Accompanying this notion was the longstanding belief that the criminal penalties for copyright infringement were too slight, even when employed, to be effective deterrents of such conduct.8 In addition, it has been noted that recent
Supreme Court cases liberalizing the rights of defendants have so
increased the burdens of criminal prosecution that "any lawyer of
wisdom [w] ould opt for the surer civil field whenever possible." 9

5.

6.
7.

8.

9,

e.g., Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897) (an unauthorized public performance of a copyrighted dramatic or musical composition, if done willfully
and for profit, deemed a misdemeanor and made punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124
(1790) (an unauthorized copying of a copyrighted map, chart or book resulted
in fixed civil penalties to be assessed per copy confiscated, with one-half of
said penalties being paid to the United States).
Gawthrop, An Inquiry into Criminal Copyright Infringement, 20 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. Syxep. 154, 168 (1972). Accord, Wicher, Criminal Copyright Infringement and the General Revision of the Copyright Law, 2 PuBUSMIG,
ENTERTAINMENT, ADVERTISING & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 391, 396-97 (1963).
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
H. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS § 175, at 701 (1953); Gawthrop,
supra note 5, at 167-69.
It may be that civil actions are preferred by injured copyright owners
since they offer a more lucrative result. To "charge an author with
willfully infringing a copyright by plagiarism is to charge him with a
crime," [Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)] and
though charges of that nature are sometimes made in civil actions
there is seldom any resulting criminal prosecution.
Strauss, Remedies Other Than Damagesfor Copyright Infringement,2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1029, 1040 (1963) (footnote citation bracketed). Cf.Gawthrop, supra note 5, at 167-68 (exploring suggestion that civil remedies are so
severe and penal in nature that they are, in effect, criminal sanctions).
Wicher, supra note 5, at 397. Cf.A. LAWmAN,THE COPYRIGnT LAW: HOWEU..'S
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 252 (5th ed. 1979) (copyright not a
high priority to most United States attorneys in their fight against crime);
Sargoy, Rescinding the Supreme Court's Rules for CopyrightProcedureunder
See. 101, Title 17, 9 BuLL.COPYRIGHT Soc'y 349, 355 (1962) (United States attorneys reluctant to invoke expense and pursue difficult investigation and
trial to prosecute copyright infringers when result of conviction is merely a
misdemeanor).
Gawthrop, supra note 5, at 169.
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Despite these considerations which tend to diminish the enforcement of the criminal infringement provisions, the importance
of criminal penalties for copyright infringement has increased with
the rise in the prominence and profitability of the sound recording
and motion picture industries. The economics of commercial authorship have changed drastically since the enactment of the first
criminal provisions:
Prior to 1909 most copyrightable works were created by individuals working alone andcthe financial investment of copyright entrepreneurs (primarily publishers) was relatively small by today's standards. After 1909 with
the rapid growth of the sound recording, motion picture and television industries, the creation of a large number of copyrighted works involved not
merely a single author but groups of individuals each adding his own expertise to the creation of a final work. This in turn involved large amounts
of initial capital investment to bring these author teams together and to
acquire the high cost technology required for creating the works. These
factors greatly increased the risks of a fair economic return on any particular copyrighted work, always dependent on1 0the promotional skills of the
entrepreneur and the whim of public taste.

The growth of the recording and motion picture industries has
been paralleled by a corresponding increase in the unauthorized
copying and vending of such works." In response to this increase
and perhaps as an implicit recognition of the toll taken by inflation,12 Congress enacted stiffer penalties for criminal infringement 13 and the United States Department of Justice initiated an
intensive enforcement program designed to apprehend large-scale
14
commercial copyright infringers.
The result of the recent congressional attention given to crimi15
nal copyright is found in section 506 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
This section, a consolidation of the prior federal criminal provisions relating to copyright, 16 provides two sets of criminal penalties for copyright infringements. With respect to infringements
committed "willfully and for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain," section 506 (a) provides: (1) for infringement generally, a maximum fine of $10,000 and/or one year's
imprisonment; and (2) for infringement of sound recordings and
10. Lindenberg-Woods, The Smoking Revolver: Criminal Copyright Infringement, 27 BULL. COPYRUGHT Soc'y 63, 67 (1979).

11. R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 564 (3d ed. 1979); Grumar, CriminalInfringement of Copyright, J. BEVERLY lniLS BAL 62, 62 (July/Aug., 1976).
12. Gawthrop, supra note 5, at 157.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1976). See notes 50-58 & accompanying text infra.
14. Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 76; N.Y. Times, May 30, 1975, at 62, col. 1.
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976). Except for selected portions given immediate effect,
this comprehensive copyright law revision became effective on January 1,
1978.
16. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1976) with 17 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. V 1975) and 17
U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
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motion pictures, a maximum fine of $25,000 and/or one year's imprisonment for the first offense, and a maximum fine of $50,000
17
and/or two years' imprisonment, for any subsequent offense.
Section 506(b) provides that upon a defendant's conviction of
copyright infringement, the court must order the destruction and
forfeiture of all infringing copies and all equipment used in their
manufacture.m Other conduct is also deemed criminal by the provisions of section 506. Sections 506(c) and (d) provide a maximum
fine of $2,500 for the fraudulent use, alteration or removal of a copyright notice.19 In addition, the false representation of a material
fact in the application for copyright registration is subject to a
similar fine under the provisions of section 506(e).20
This article focuses primarily on the criminal provisions for
copyright infringement contained in section 506(a). The statutory
changes resulting from the 1976 copyright revision are explored
and the existence of state criminal copyright provisions for the infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings is discussed. In addition,
the interaction between criminal and civil copyright infringement
actions arising from the same conduct is examined, with particular
emphasis upon the application of collateral estoppel principles in a
civil infringement action following a section 506(a) conviction.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1976). The complete language of § 506 is reproduced in the
text accompanying note 29 infra.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1976).
19. Id. § 506(c), (d). With regard to "copyright notice", 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976)
provides:
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a
notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on all
publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
The "notice of copyright" prescribed by § 401 must include three elements:
(1) the symbol ©, the word "Copyright" or the abbreviation "Copr."; (2) the
name of the copyright proprietor, and (3) the year that the work was first
published. Id. § 401(b). In addition, the notice must be affixed on the copies
in such a manner and location so that "reasonable notice" is given of the
copyright claim. Id. § 401(c).
20. Id. § 506(e). The 1976 Copyright Act does' contain one additional criminal
provision. A fine of not more than $2,500 may be imposed on any person who,
in filing an application for a compulsory license for a coin-operated phonorecord player, knowingly makes a false representation of a material fact,
knowingly alters a compulsory license certificate or knowingly affixes such a
certificate to a phonorecord player other than the one it covers. 17 U.S.C.
§ 116(d) (1976).
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THE LANGUAGE AND INTENT OF SECTION 506

The Ancestry of Section 506: 1909-1974

As previously noted,2 1 criminal sanctions for infringement were
not always included in the scheme of American copyright law. The
first general criminal provision appeared in the 1909 Copyright
Act 22 as section 28.23 A conviction of criminal infringement under
section 28 was deemed a misdemeanor and carried a maximum
fine of $1,000. This provision of the 1909 Act, which covers all types
of works and nearly all means of infringement, ultimately became
17 U.S.C. § 104.24
Section 104 remained virtually unchanged until 1974 when Congress amended it to add separate penalties for the unauthorized
25
reproduction (often referred to as "piracy") of sound recordings.
The 1974 amendment provided much greater penalties for record
piracy in order to reduce the economic incentives flowing from
such conduct. 2 6 After the 1974 amendment, section 104 appeared
as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who willfully
and for profit shall infringe any copyright secured by this title, or who
shall knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringement, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be
punished by imprisonment for not exceeding one year or by a fine of not
less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or both, in the discretion of the court:
Provided, however, that nothing in this title shall be so construed as to
prevent the performance of religious or secular works such as oratorios,
cantatas, masses, or octavo choruses by public schools, church choirs, or
vocal societies, rented, borrowed, or obtained from some public library,
public school, church choir, school choir, or vocal society, provided the
21. See notes 3-4 & accompanying text supra.
22. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). A brief review of
federal criminal copyright sanctions in the United States prior to 1909 is contained in Grumar, supra note 11, at 63-64.
23.
That any person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright secured by this Act, or who shall knowingly and willfully aid or
abet such infringement, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for
not exceeding one year or by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or both, in the discretion of
the court: Provided, however, That nothing in this Act shall be so
construed as to prevent the performance of religious or secular
works, such as oratorios, cantatas, masses, or octavo choruses by
public schools, church choirs, or vocal societies, rented, borrowed, or
obtained from some public library, public school, church choir,
school choir, or vocal society, provided the performance is given for
charitable or educational purposes and not for profit.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
24. Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-281, 61 Stat. 652 (1947).
25. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1581, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEws 6849.
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performance is given for charitable or educational purposes and not for
profit.
(b) Any person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright provided by section l(f) of this title [sound recordings], or who
should knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringement, shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both,
for the first offense and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned
27
not more than two years, or both, for any subsequent offense.

This was the state of the federal criminal provision for copyright
infringement when the 1976 Copyright Act was passed. However,
before section 506 is examined, it should be noted that the 1974
amendment to section 104, besides extending criminal law protection to sound recordings, provided another major addition to the
criminal copyright scheme. A second conviction for sound recording infringement was made punishable by a maximum prison sentence of two years in addition to the possible fines. Since any
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
is classified as a felony under federal law,2 8 this change meant that
a willful and profit-motivated infringement was no longer merely a
misdemeanor in all cases.
B.

Section 506
Enacted as part of a comprehensive revision of the federal
copyright laws, section 506 provides:
(a)

(b)

(c)

Criminal infringement
Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes
of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both:
Provided,however, that any person who infringes willfully and for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain the
copyright in a sound recording afforded by subsections (1), (2), or
(3) of section 106 or the copyright in a motion picture afforded by
subsections (1), (3), or (4) of section 106 shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, for
the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both, for any subsequent
offense.
Forfeiture and destruction
When any person is convicted of any violation of subsection (a),
the court in its judgment of conviction shall, in addition to the penalty therein prescribed, order the forfeiture and destruction or other
disposition of all infringing copies or phonorecords and all implements, devices, or equipment used in the manufacture of such infringing copies or phonorecords.
Fraudulent copyright notice
Any person who, with fraudulent intent, places on any article a
notice of copyright or words of the same purport that such person
knows to be false, or who, with fraudulent intent, publicly distributes

27. 17 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. V. 1975).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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or imports for public distribution any article bearing such notice or
words that such person knows to be false, shall be fined not more
than $2,500.
Fraudulent removal of copyright notice
Any person who, with fraudulent intent, removes or alters any notice of copyright appearing on a copy of a copyrighted work shall be
fined not more than $2,500.
False representation
Any person who knowingly makes a false representation of a material fact in the application for copyright registration provided for by
section 409, or in any written statement filed in connection with the
application, shall be fined not more than $2,500.29

Although this article is concerned primarily with the implications of actions for criminal infringement of copyright under section 506(a), other conduct specified by section 506 as deserving of
criminal penalties should not be seen as completely unimportant.
The section 506 provisions prohibiting the fraudulent use, alteration or removal of a copyright notice (subsections (c) and (d))
were carried forward with no major changes 3 0 from section 105 of
the 1909 law.3 1 It is interesting to note that the only reported case
under section 105, Scarves by Vera, Inc., v. American Handbags,
Inc.,32 was not even a criminal prosecution. In that civil action,
injunctive relief was sought for the removal of copyright notice,
but the court held that section 105 implied no civil remedy since it
33
was strictly a criminal provision based on fraudulent intent.
34
The other criminal provision of section 506, subsection (e),
which provides a fine for any person making a false representation
of a material fact in accordance with a copyright application, is a
recent addition to the criminal sanctions of copyright law. 35 The
Register of Copyrights was initially opposed to this provision 36 because the United States Criminal Code provides severe penalties
(up to five years in prison and/or a fine of up to $10,000) for anyone
29. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1976).
30. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 506(c), (d) (1976) with 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
31. Originally § 29 in the Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L No. 60-349, § 29, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909).
32. 188 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
33. For an extended analysis of § 105, see Berger, False Use of Copyright Notice, 1
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 297 (1963). In addition, Nimmer provides a cursory
discussion of subsections (c) and (d) in his treatise. M. NIMMER, 3 NMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 15.02 (1980).
34. Nimmer briefly reviews subsection (e) in his treatise. M. NMMER, supra note
33, § 15.03.
35. But see 17 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (making false affidavit for the purpose of obtaining registration of a claim to copyright deemed a misdemeanor).
36. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 135 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as REGISTER'S REPORT].

1981]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

who knowingly makes false statements or uses false documents
"in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States. '37 However, the Register later agreed to the
inclusion of subsection (e), determining that it was probably better to classify false representation before the Copyright Office as a
misdemeanor rather than a felony. In addition, the Register decided that there would be some practical advantage in having such
38
a provision explicitly stated in the body of the copyright laws.
C.

Criminal Infringement Changes: Sections 104 to 506(a)

The alterations, additions and deletions made upon the existing criminal infringement provision to achieve the language of
section 506(a) were badly needed and were long overdue. However, these changes do not represent a major change in the nature
of criminal infringement. The old criminal provision, as well as the
entire scheme of federal copyright law, was in need of revision to
keep pace with the technological and economic advances of society. The basic impact of the federal criminal infringement provision was not altered by the 1976 Act; a willful infringement for
purposes of financial gain could still incur criminal liability. Nevertheless, the changes that were made by the 1976 Act deserve examination.
Section 506(a) is divided into two sections: a general infringement section and a section devoted exclusively to the infringement
of sound recordings and motion pictures. The general infringement section, although remaining the same in spirit, underwent
four basic alterations in the 1976 Act: (1) a refining of the language
relating to the "for profit" element of criminal infringement; (2) the
deletion of any reference to aiders and abettors; (3) a reassessment of the criminal infringement penalties; and (4) the elimination of the clause which provided certain choral groups the
privilege of freely performing copyrighted works if the perform39
ance was for nonprofit educational or charitable purposes.
The portion of section 104 dealing with sound recordings also
was altered in the 1976 revision. In order to be consistent with the
general criminal infringement section, the language pertaining to
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
38. HOUSE COMM.ON THE JuDIcIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 4, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT
FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 171 (Comm. Print 1964) (Statements of
Barbara A. Ringer, Copyright Office).
39. There was one other change. The clause, "In the discretion of the court,"
which followed the enumeration of the applicable penalties for criminal infringement in § 104, was not included in the language of § 506(a), presumably
because it was unnecessary.
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the "for profit" element was appropriately revised and the reference to aiders and abettors was dropped. Further changes in the
sound recording clause include the specific inclusion of motion picture infringements in this increased penalties section and the
enumeration of the specific exclusive rights in sound recordings
infringement of which will give rise to crimiand motion pictures,
40
nal liability.
1.

For Purposes of Commercial Advantage or Private
FinancialGain

For liability to accrue under section 104, the criminal provision
of the 1909 Act, an infringement must have been committed "for
profit." This element of criminal infringement is made more distinct by the language of the 1976 Act. In order to incur criminal
liability under section 506(a), an infringement must be committed
"for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain."
The congressional reasoning behind this change was not revealed,
that the two phrases are meant to be substantially
but it appears
41
equivalent.
Perhaps the reason for this change was to emphasize the
profitable purpose of an infringement rather than the profitable result of an infringement. Under the phrase "for profit," it may have
been a viable defense to an infringement prosecution for an accused to offer proof that no financial gain actually resulted from
the infringing conduct. 42 This aspect of criminal infringement was
43
the focus of the district court's attention in United States v. Taxe,
a prosecution for the infringement of sound recordings under section 104. Upon the defendant's conviction, the Taxe court issued a
memorandum opinion accompanied by its instructions to the jury.
Regarding the profitable aspects of the defendant's conduct, the
court instructed:
'Profit' includes the sale or exchange of the infringing work for something
for value in the hope of some pecuniary gain. It is irrelevant whether the
hope of gain was realized or not. The requirement of profit is intended to
infringements for merely perdelineate commercial infringements from 44
sonal use and philanthropic infringements.

This court's interpretation of the "for profit" requirement of a criminal infringement appears to be in accord with the "for purposes of
40. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1976). See notes 64-67 & accompanying text infra.
41. M. NimmER, supra note 33, § 15.01, at 15-1 n.1, 15-4 n.16. See HousE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, H.R. Doc. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 163 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
42. Gawthrop, supra note 5, at 165.
43. 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
44. 380 F. Supp. at 1018.
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commercial advantage or private financial gain" language of section 506(a). It should be noted, however, that under section 506(a)
it is possible that an infringer may even be liable for an infringement made for personal use if there is any aspect of "private
financial gain" involved.4 5
2. Aiders or Abettors
Besides imposing criminal liability on a willful and for profit infringer, section 104 also provided the same penalties for any person
who knowingly and willfully aided or abetted such infringing conduct. In addition to broadening the scope of the criminal infringement sanctions, this provision provided authors in 1909 with a
statutory deterrent against the vendors, agents and theater managers who aided elusive or judgment-proof infringers in promoting
their unauthorized copies.4 6 Even though this "aid or abet" provi45. The distinction between commercial and personal infringements made by the

Taxe court was also noted by the court in United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp.
726 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Bily, who owned a massive collection of motion picture
films, was accused of criminal copyright infringement. Stating that "Congress did not intend to make the bona fide film hobbiest [sic] a criminal," id.
at 733, the Bily court essentially held the single sale of a film print by a film
collector or hobbyist insufficient to bring that person's conduct within the
"for profit" requirement of § 104. In addition, the court observed that even if a
film hobbyist willfuily infringed the copyright in a motion picture by making
an unauthorized copy, "he is civilly liable to the copyright holder for the damages caused by the infringement, but for that act alone he cannot be convicted under 17 U.S.C. 104." Id.
The statements made by the Taxe and Bily courts implying exemption
from criminal liability for the private infringer are dictum, and of doubtful
force in light of the "private financial gain" language of § 506(a). A private
film or record collection may represent a substantial asset and the willful sale
of infringing prints or phonorecords to support and enlarge such a collection
is clearly an act done for private financial gain. Lindenberg-Woods, supra
note 10, at 82. A technical reading of § 506(a) may even make the requirement of a "sale" unnecessary. Even an unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work for the purely personal reason of enlarging the size (and value)
of a private collection may satisfy the "private financial gain" element of
criminal infringement.
While the private collector may technically qualify for criminal liability
under § 506(a), such persons should not be the subject of government prosecutions. The sanctions of § 506(a) are best imposed upon the large-scale commercial infringers whose conduct has greater economic implications upon the
entertainment industry than the acts of a hobbyist.
46.
Pirates of all categories of copyrighted works were both financially
irresponsible and transient in their business locations, making injunctions and civil damages futile. In the same vein authors of musical and dramatic works emphasized the need to make it a crime to
aid and abet willful infringement because it was impossible to apprehend actors or singers who performed works without permission because they were constantly moving from town to town. The only
feasible deterrent to these unauthorized performances was to hold
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sion was eliminated from the language of section 506(a) in the 1976
Copyright Act, such conduct is no less a concern today. The continued inclusion of such a provision in the new section 506(a)
would have been merely superfluous, however, because under the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2,4 7 aiders, abettors and other accessories
before the fact of any offense defined as criminal by federal law are
treated as principals in the commission of the offense.4 Therefore,
to include any mention of aiders or
there is no longer the need
49
abettors in section 506(a).
3. Penalties
a.

Fines

The revision of the applicable fines for conviction of a general
criminal infringement represents the most substantial, and probably the most necessary, change resulting from the 1976 revision of
section 104. The 1909 law provided maximum and minimum fines
of $1,000 and $100 respectively, for conviction of willful and for
profit infringement. In section 506(a), the maximum fine, for all
infringements except those of sound recordings and motion pictures, 5 0 has been increased substantially to $10,000,51 and "in conformity with the general pattern of the Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.),

47.
48.

49.

50.
51.

theater managers and agents criminally liable for aiding and abetting.
Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 66 (footnote omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts,Civil
Liberties,and the Administrationof Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (May 8, 1975) (statement of Irwin Goldbloom,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice)
[hereinafter cited as Copyright Hearings]. Accessories after the fact of any
offense defined as criminal by federal law, e.g., criminal copyright infringement, are covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1976), and conspirators to such conduct
fall within the bounds of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
Interestingly, one commentator points out that the original version of 18
U.S.C. § 2 was passed by Congress on the same day as the 1909 Copyright Act
(March 4, 1909), so there may have been no reason to include the "aid or
abet" provision in the federal copyright laws in the first place. See Grumar,
supra note 11, at 74.
See notes 62-63 & accompanying text infra.
The hearings and reports preceding the copyright revision illustrate the concern that the increased criminal penalties for infringement were needed to
deter blatant piracy. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG.,
IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw:
1965 REVISION BIL 139 (Comm. Print 1965); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PART 2, DISCUSSION AND
COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL RE-

VISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 179-82 (Comm. Print 1963).
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no minimum fines have been provided."5 2 This increase, although
certainly provided to enhance the deterrent effect of the law, is undoubtedly linked to the pattern of general inflation prevailing in
the United States economy. The pattern of fines applicable to
sound recording (and now motion picture 53) infringements was
unaltered in the 1976 revision. This lack of change is understandable, since these fines were not outdated, having been established
in the latest (1974) amendment to section 104.
b. Incarceration
Although the maximum fine for a general criminal infringement
is now $10,000, conviction is still only a misdemeanor, since it is
punishable by not more than one year's imprisonment.5 4 In 1975,
efforts by the Justice Department to increase the incarceration
penalty to the level of a felony for subsequent offenders 5 failed,
and the term of imprisonment under section 506(a) remains the
same today as it was in 1909. The incarceration penalties for criminal infringement of sound recordings5 6(and now motion pictures)
were unchanged by the 1976 revision.
The failure to enact stiffer incarceration penalties for criminal
copyright infringement indicates an apparent hesitancy on the
part of Congress to classify criminal infringers as felons. Perhaps
this is in adherence to the time-honored concept that a felony is
"as bad a word as you can give to man or thing."57 It is also interesting to note that there are no criminal penalties specifically
stated in either the federal patent or trademark statutes, even for
willful infringement. 5 8
52. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 41, at 163. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TI-I CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 5, 1964 REVISION BILL
wrrIH DISCUSSION AND COmMENTS 200 (Comm. Print 1965) (Statements of Abe
A. Goldman, Copyright Office).
53. See notes 62-63 & accompanying text infra.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
55. Copyright Hearings,supra note 48, at 157. See also SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
145-46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
56. But see the Senate version of the 1976 Act, § 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 506(a)

(1975), which provided that a first-time conviction for sound recording or motion picture infringement would carry a three-year maximum sentence, with
each subsequent offense punishable by up to seven years in prison. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 55, at 30,146.
57. 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 465 (2d ed. 1905).
One commentator suggests that the failure by Congress to enact stiffer prison
penalties resulted from "countervailing perceptions of copyright and its relationship to the principles of a competitive economy." Lindenberg-Woods,

supra note 10, at 69.
58. For a thoughtful analysis of this apparent inconsistency, see LindenbergWoods, supra note 10, at 69-71.
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The ChoralPerformances Exemption

The exemption from criminal infringement liability given certain nonprofit choral performances 59 and contained in section 104
of the 1909 law was not carried forward into section 506(a). It was
also part of the excess verbiage of the 1909 Act which, upon revision, could be excised. Indeed, it was said that "[slince all nonprofit performances of music are exempt under the general
''60
provision of the law, this proviso . . .is entirely superfluous.
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, it appears that section 11061 provides these types of exemptions for both civil and criminal instances, so the inclusion of any such exemptions in section 506(a)
would be redundant.
5. Increased Penaltiesfor Motion Picture Infringement
Although motion pictures have been federally copyrightable
since 1912,62 prior to the 1976 Copyright Act an action for the criminal infringement of such works could only result in at most, one
year's imprisonment and a fine of $1,000. Recognizing that the
piracy of motion pictures had developed into a very lucrative enterprise, 63 Congress included the infringement of such works in
the greater penalties portion of section 506(a) dealing with sound
recordings.
6. Sound Recording and Motion Picture Copyright Rights
Protected by Section 506(a)
Section 506(a) specifically denotes the section 10664 exclusive
rights65 in sound recordings which, upon infringement, will give
rise to criminal liability. These rights are enumerated as: (1) the
59. See note 23 supra.
60. REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 27. One pre-revision commentator, although agreeing with the proposed deletion of the choral performances exception, criticized this statement by the Register as too broad. See Wicher,
supra note 5, at 392-94.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1976) ("Limitations on exclusive rights: Exemption of certain
performances and displays").
62. Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 37 Stat. 488 (1912).
63. See N.Y. Times, May 30, 1975, at 62, col. 1. This news item reports the indictment of 16 persons for the criminal infringement of motion pictures, conspiracy and transporting stolen property. See also BYT.ToARD, Mar. 18, 1978, at 3
(report that authorities have found $150 million of illegal duplicating and
pressing machines, and have destroyed 2.2 million bootleg 8-track tapes
worth $1.3 million along with 40,000 reels of film and/or videotapes).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) ("Exclusive rights in copyrighted works").
65. It should be noted that the "exclusive rights" of § 106 are subject to the provisions of sections 107 through 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act. Id. See, e.g., note
67 infra.
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right to reproduce the copyrighted sound recording; (2) the right to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted sound recording; and (3) the right to distribute phonorecords 66 of the copyrighted sound recording to the public by sale, rental, lease, lending,
or other transfer of ownership. The inclusion of these specific section 106 rights in the new criminal infringement section is not a
change in effect from section 104; instead, it is merely a change in
language so that section 506(a)67 will be in accord with the rest of
the revised copyright statutes.
With the inclusion of motion pictures in the greater penalties
section of 506(a), it also became necessary to specify the applicable exclusive rights of section 106 that would be protected with
criminal liability. These rights are: (1) the right to reproduce the
copyrighted motion picture; (2) the right to distribute copies of the
copyrighted motion picture to the public by sale, rental, lease,
lending or other transfer of ownership; and (3) the right to perform the copyrighted motion picture publicly. The enumeration of
the rights protected by section 506(a) for both sound recordings
and motion pictures, while probably not absolutely necessary,
should serve to quell confusion concerning exactly what conduct
will give rise to criminal liability.
D.

Section 506(b)-Forfeiture and Destruction

Section 506(b) provides that, upon conviction for criminal infringement, the presiding court must "order the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all infringing copies or
phonorecords and all implements, devices, or equipment used in
' '68
the manufacture of such infringing copies or phonorecords.
This provision is completely new, and apparently was included in
the 1976 Act upon the urging of the Justice Department. The rea66. Phonorecords are the material objects in which sound recordings are fixed.
They are statutorily defined as the
material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method
now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. The term "phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixecL
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
67. See Copyright Hearings,supra note 48, at 137. "The exclusive rights of the
owner of copyright in a sound recording are limited to the rights specified by
clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106, and do not include any right of performance under section 106(4)." 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1976). Section 114 further
narrows these exclusive rights of sound recording copyright ownership in
subsection (b), which must be considered to determine if there has been an
infringement (civil or criminal) of such works.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1976).
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son this provision became necessary was merely one of "jailhouse
housekeeping," as noted at the 1975 House Committee on the Judiciary hearings on the general copyright revision:
At present, the government has no clear-cut authority to destroy infringing articles which have been seized or otherwise obtained in the investigation or prosecution of a tape piracy case or, for that matter, any
criminal copyright infringement case. This lack of specific authority has
resulted in critical storage problems for many F.B.I. and U.S. Marshalls'
offices throughout the country and poses the embarrassing possibility that
the government may69be ordered to return known infringing articles to a
convicted defendant.

There is a similar provision relating to civil infringements, 17
U.S.C. § 503(b), 70 under which the presiding court, upon final judgment or decree, may order the destruction of all infringing copies
or phonorecords and any equipment used to produce them. These
criminal and civil provisions differ in one major respect. In a civil
infringement action, the remedy of destruction is in the court's disin the criminal context, such decretion, while upon conviction
71
struction is mandatory.
III.

STATE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS

State laws designed to provide or to protect rights equivalent to
those provided by federal copyright and attached to works which
are within the scope of federal copyright are invalid by operation
by the federal pre-emption doctrine. This notion is made quite
clear by the codification of the federal pre-emption doctrine in the
1976 Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301.72 One class of works, sound
recordings, is not fully included in this general rule of pre-emption.73 Federal copyright in sound recordings did not exist prior to
February 15, 1972, 7 4 so only those sound recordings fixed after that

date are protected by federal law, and state laws dealing with the
exclusive rights of federal copyright in sound recordings prepared
after that date are specifically preempted by section 301. In order
for a party to obtain relief, either civilly or criminally, for the unauthorized copying of sound recordings fixed prior to February 15,
69. CopyrightHearings,supra note 48, at 156. See also id. at 144-45 (comments of
Mr. John Murphy, Justice Department, and Rep. Robert F. Drinan).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 509 grants the government the authority to seize all articles (copies, phonorecords, equipment, etc.) used in violation of § 506(a). Again, a
similar provision exists in the civil arena as well: 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1976).
Nimmer notes the possible constitutional problems of these two seizure sections in his treatise. M. NIm4ER, supra note 33, §§ 14.07, 15.01, at 15-2 n.5.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1976).
74. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
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1972, it is necessary to resort to state law.7 5 The need for state action in this area was made particularly acute by the tremendous
increase in record piracy 6 and counterfeiting 77 activity during the
75. Of course, the underlying musical composition, if copyrighted, is protected by
federal copyright law. The interesting aspect of this fact is that prior to 1972,
it was possible for record pirates to make and vend unauthorized phonorecords without being subjected to federal criminal prosecution if they tendered to the copyright proprietor of the underlying musical composition the
royalty fees demanded under the compulsory licensing provision of the 1909
laws. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1976)). This notion has fallen into general
disfavor, however, with several federal courts holding that the making of
identical copies of recorded versions of copyrighted musical compositions is
not a "similar use" as permitted by the compulsory license provision of the
1909 Copyright Act. See, e.g., Heilman v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 1106, 1110-11 (E.D.
Wis. 1975). The effect of these decisions is that record pirates may be held
criminally liable for duplicating sound recordings fixed prior to February 15,
1972, even if they tendered the two-cent licensing fee to the composition copyright proprietor.
76. "Piracy in the record business applies to the unauthorized duplication of
tapes or records sold openly as manufactured without permission of the record company. The pirates may sell under their own label or with no label
identification at all." S. SHEMEL & M. KRAsUaovsKY, TmIs BUSINESS OF MUSIC

93 (rev. & enlarged 4th ed. 1979). Record or tape piracy is not a small problem.
It is estimated that the recording industry incurred losses of approximately
$200 million in 1979 because of such conduct. Whitefield, Record PiratesHit
Gold, Omaha World Herald, Mar. 30, 1980, Entertainment Magazine, at 1,
col. 1.
77. "Counterfeiting in the record business consists of the unauthorized manufacture and distribution of copies of records under the guise of products of the
authorized manufacturer." S. SHEMEL & M. KRAsI.ovsKY, supra note 76, at
93. Sometimes, the phonorecord and its package are so flawlessly duplicated
that even the recording companies' quality control experts cannot tell the
counterfeit from the legitimate. Whitefield, supra note 76.
From its crude beginnings in the 1960s, record counterfeiting has
blossomed into a multimillion-dollar underground business, threatening the livelihood of record producers, singers and musicians.
Counterfeiting now is believed to be the major source of income
for criminals with ties to organized crime, aided, it has been charged,
by some record retailers and distributors. Hundreds of professional
counterfeiting networks are said to stritch across the United States
and into foreign countries.
The recording industry lost $400 million-or nearly $1.1 million
per day-to counterfeiters last year [1979], according to the Recording Industry Association of America. The FBrs estimate is $600 million.
The Recording Industry Association of America now estimates
that one in four pre-recorded tapes and one in 10 albums are counterfeit.
Id.
In addition to federal copyright protection for sound recordings fixed after
February 15, 1972, it is also a federal crime to knowingly and with fraudulent
intent transport, sell or receive any phonorecord to which is affixed any
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late 1960's and early 1970's.7 8
As a direct result of the increase in unauthorized reproduction
of sound recordings and the lack of federal protection for such
works fixed prior to 1972, recording companies began a concerted
79
campaign to achieve anti-record piracy legislation in all states.
This activity has resulted in appropriate legislation in the majority
of states-thirty-seven at last count 8O-in an attempt to give some
protection to those sound recordings not protected under federal
law. Typical of the nature of state liability in this area is the Nebraska law, which in part provides:
[I] t is unlawful for any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association knowingly to (1) transfer or cause to be transferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, ifim, or other article on
which sounds are recorded onto any other phonograph record, disc, wire,
tape, film, or other article, or (2) sell, distribute, circulate, offer for sale,
distribution or circulation, possess for the purpose of sale, distribution or
circulation, or cause to be sold, distributed or circulated, offered for sale,
distribution or circulation, or possessed for sale, distribution or circulation, any article or device on which sounds have been transferred without
the consent of the person who owns the master phonograph record,
master disc, master tape, master wire, master film, or other article from
which the sounds are derived.8 1

Conviction under this Nebraska statute is a class II misdemeanor,
carrying a maximum imprisonment of six months and/or a maximum fine of $1,000.82 These penalties are typical of those imposed
by most state anti-piracy statutes, although some states, particularly those in which the entertainment and recording industries

78.

79.
80.

81.
82.

forged, falsely made or counterfeited label. 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1976). The sanctions under § 2318 are similar in nature to those of § 506(a) for the infringement of sound recordings.
See S. SHEMEL & M. KRAsmovsKY, supra note 76, at 93-94. The problem of the
making and selling of unauthorized phonorecords is not a new one, see Comment, Performers'Rights and Copyright: The Protectionof Sound Recordings
from Modern Pirates, 59 CAIzF. L. REv. 548 (1971) and Note, Piracy on
Records, 5 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1953), but the increase in market and advances
in reproduction technology have made it substantially more lucrative. See,
e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronics Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); S. SHEMEL & M. KRAsnovSKY, supra note 76, at 93.
A. LArmAN, supra note 8, at 251; S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 76,
at 96.
10,901-11,241. This service reproduces
See [19791 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
the pertinent statutes from each of the 37 states with anti-record piracy legislation. See generally 23 BuLT- COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 321 (1976) ("State Antipiracy
Legislation"). The validity of such state laws was upheld under a challenge
based on the federal pre-emption doctrine in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1323 (Reissue 1979).
Id. § 28-1326. See id. § 28-106.
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are prominent, provide much stronger sanctions upon conviction. 83
Besides enacting "record piracy" statutes similar to Nebraska's,
many states prohibit the "counterfeiting" of recording packaging
also prohibit the unor identifying data. In addition, some states
84
authorized recording of live performances.
There are naturally some differences in the scope of protection
and form of copyright between the federal and state systems.
While the 1976 Copyright Act places a time limit on the copyright
protection of all materials copyrighted thereunder,85 none of the
state statutes contain such time limits. Therefore, it is conceivable
that a sound recording covered by the state statutes would never
pass into the public domain and thus never lose its protection
under those statutes. This is not the case, however, since the preemption provision of the 1976 Act effectively places a time limit on
all state protection equivalent to that of federal copyright. Section
301(c) of the 1976 Act provides, "[w]ith respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under
the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or
limited by this title until February 15, 2047."86 A further distinction
between state anti-record piracy statutes and federal copyright law
is that, unlike the federal law, no form of notice or registration is
necessary to entitle sound recordings to the protection of the state
87
statute.
It should also be noted that just because a particular state has
not enacted a specific anti-record piracy statute does not necessarily mean that pre-1972 protection is unavailable to a sound recording owner in that jurisdiction. Other forms of prosecution may be
available. Some states have employed more general civil and criminal property protection statutes, such as those prohibiting "unfair
competition," to protect sound recording owners against record
piracy.88
IV. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Under the 1976 Act, both criminal and civil liability for copyright
83. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(b) (West Cur. Supp. 1980) (Hollywood); TENN.
-CODE ANN. § 39-4249 (1975) (Nashville).
84. [1979] CoPyRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 10,901.
85. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (1976).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1976). The year 2047 was chosen because it is 75 years
from 1972. Seventy-five years is the copyright duration determined appropriate by Congress for works existing when the new copyright laws were enacted. See Copyright Hearings, supra note 48, at 1911 (Dec. 4, 1975)
(comments of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights).
87. Dunaj, Tape Piracy and Applicable Florida CriminalLaws, 48 FLA.B.J. 338,

340 (1974).
88.

[1979] COPYrGHT L REP. (CCH) 1 10,901.
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infringement may arise from the same activity-an unauthorized
reproduction of a validly copyrighted work. The imposition of liability in these two areas is not identical, however. The distinctions
between a civil and criminal action for infringement, and the
problems inherent in relating the two to the same conduct, are explored in this section.
The obvious tie that binds civil and criminal liability for copyright infringement is the "infringement" itself.89 The federal copyright statutes do not define infringement, 90 and it should be noted
that not all infringements are entirely suited to criminal liability.
For purposes of this discussion, an "infringement" is limited to the
conduct of a person who reproduces the copyrighted work exactly
and sells the copies without the copyright proprietor's permission.
This is the usual situation in large-scale commercial copying operations, such as record, tape or movie piracy, which are clearly the
most appropriate for the imposition of criminal liability.
"[P] lagiarism, where the infringer adopts a substantial amount of
the protected expression in a copyrighted work as his own original
creation,"9 1 is too indefinite and vague for the imposition of criminal liability. It involves too much of a factual determination to be
appropriate as conduct giving rise to criminal sanctions, 92 since it
89. "[C]riminal copyright infringement incorporates as one of its elements the
concept of civil copyright infringement." United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp.
726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
90.
Although there is no statutory definition of infringement of copyright, it may be readily inferred from the provisions of Title 17 United
States Code § 1(a), conferring upon the copyright proprietor the exclusive right to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted
work. (Emphasis supplied). The grant of these exclusive rights implies the prohibition that others shall not exercise them without the
consent of the copyright proprietor; to do so without such consent
would be infringement of copyright.
United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D. Tex 1959). Under this interpretation, a general infringement under § 506(a) would be the unauthorized
invasion of any of the copyright proprietor's exclusive rights under § 106, and
a criminal infringement of a sound recording or motion picture would be the
unauthorized invasion of any of the § 106 exclusive rights enumerated in
§ 506(a). See notes 64-67 & accompanying text supra.
While the 1976 Copyright Act does not provide a definition of a copyright
"infringement," it does provide a definition of a copyright "infringer": "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118, or who imports copies or phonorecords into
the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976). While this may be a satisfactory definition for civil
infringement purposes, criminal infringement requires additional elements
as prerequisites to liability. See notes 139-51 & accompanying text infra.
91. Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 73.
92. The basic problem inherent in imposing liability for plagiarism is: How much
copying is enough? 50%? 75%? This is a problem in civil instances as well as
criminal. It would seem that in the criminal arena, the only possible excep-
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requires a person to speculate as to whether a certain act or manner of conduct is forbidden. On this point, one commentator has
noted that criminal penalties are inappropriate for plagiarism "because to draw the line between idea and expression and to further
determine when substantial expression has been taken are questions which by necessity are vague and uncertain." 93 In addition,
to subject a person to criminal sanctions for merely misjudging
what quantum of expression may be taken without permission
from a particular copyrighted work would certainly have a chilling
effect upon the dissemination of ideas.94 It is possible that certain
ideas may go unexpressed, because authors would be forced to
employ considerable caution in borrowing from or drawing upon
other works in order to avoid the onus of criminal liability. 95 The
imposition of criminal liability for plagiarism, in all but perhaps
the most extreme cases, 96 is entirely inappropriate.
Although civil and criminal infringement liability may arise
from the same conduct, the nature of the resulting infringement
actions under each is different in several respects. The most obvious difference relates to the parties involved. In a criminal prosecution, the federal government is the party initiating legal action,
whereas in a civil suit, the plaintiff is a private party.97 Another

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

tion to nonliability for plagiarism would be if the copy was nearly identical to
the original work, e.g., 95% copied. See id. at 74.
Only two cases have been reported where criminal liability was invoked
for plagiarism: United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1943) and Marx
v. United States, 96 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938). In these cases, the quantum of
copying of the original work was unclear, although apparently the courts
thought it enough, since convictions under § 104 were upheld in both. See
generally Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 74-76. The fact that only two
criminal plagiarism cases have been brought since 1909 may indicate that injured copyright proprietors get complete satisfaction from civil remedies and
thus do not pursue criminal complaints. The more likely reason, however, is
that federal prosecutors, realizing the potential difficulties, have no desire to
become involved in the complex factual issues inherent in a plagiarism case.
Id. at 76.
A related problem, the difficulty of proving similarity in a less-than-identical work, is briefly discussed (with respect to musical scores) in Gawthrop,
supra note 5, at 163-64.
Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 74.
Cf. Grumar, supra note 11, at 76-77. (discussion of the first amendment implications of § 104 and the "fair use" defense in a criminal infringement action).
Id.
See note 92 supra.
But see United States v. Brown, 400 F. Supp. 656 (S.D. Miss. 1975), where it
was held that the United States may seek injunctive relief in a civil infringement action "in its capacity as parenspatriaein order to protect the rights of
all persons whose economic interest may be adversely affected by copyright
infringers." Id. at 659.
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obvious difference involves the required burden of proof: in criminal law, the government must prove its case to the fact finder "beyond a reasonable doubt," whereas in most civil actions, the
plaintiff's burden is merely to prove its case "by a preponderance
of the evidence."
One other criminal-civil distinction, of particular importance in
copyright law because it is completely codified, is the general rule
of criminal law that a penal provision is strictly construed against
the prosecution and in favor of the defendant. 98 The reason for
this statutory rule of construction, applicable to each element of
the offense, 99 is to provide adequate notice to a person as to what
conduct is prohibited. 10 0 Since there is no such corresponding
rule in the civil law area, its effect is to further limit the scope of
liability under section 506(a) relative to civil liability.' 0 '
Besides these general distinctions between criminal and civil
actions, there are some distinctions particular to copyright law
alone. As pointed out by Nimmer, "[clertain, but not all civil infringements of copyright, will also constitute criminal infringements."'1 2 The reason for this statement is that an action for
criminal infringement requires certain additional elements beyond
those required to make out a civil action. Some of these additional
elements are necessitated by statute, 103 while others arise because
the nature of criminal law requires that certain things
must be
04
proved by the prosecution rather than the defense.1
In spite of the differences between civil and criminal infringement, the lack of case law dealing with criminal infringement has
forced courts to turn to civil cases in order to interpret and apply
the criminal copyright provision. Indeed, the court in United
States v. Wells 10 5 stated:
There are few guides to the interpretation of this seldom-used criminal
statute [section 104 of the 1909 laws]. To gain any idea of its coverage or of
the protection afforded by the copyright law one must resort10 to
6 the civil
law of copyright and to the provisions of Title 17 as a whole.

All reported cases in the area of criminal infringement have arisen
under section 104 of the 1909 Copyright Act, but since the fundamental principles of criminal infringement were basically un98. See, e.g., United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 209 (1936); M. NIMMER, SUpra
note 33, § 15.01, at 15-4.
99. See Coughlan v. United States, 216 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1954).
100. See notes 92-97 & accompanying text supra.
101. M. Nin-mmE, supra note 33, § 15.01, at 15-4.
102. Id. at 15-1.
103. See notes 139-51 & accompanying text infra.
104. See notes 117-38 & accompanying text infra.
105. 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
106. Id. at 633.
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changed in the 1976 revision, these cases are still viable for
interpretive purposes of the new law.
The Elements of an Action Under Section 506(a)

A.

1.

An Infringement

A prerequisite for an action under section 506 (a) is that the government must prove that there was an unauthorized reproduction
of a copyrighted work, i.e., an infringement. Basic to both civil and
criminal infringement are two findings: (1) ownership of a valid
copyright by a person other than the alleged infringer, and (2) an
reproduction of the copyrighted work by the acunauthorized
07
cused.
Registration is a statutory prerequisite to the commencement
of an infringement action (civil or criminal)108 under the 1976
Copyright Act, 10 9 and with respect to registration, section 410 (c) of
the Act further provides that the certificate of registration of a
copyrighted work "shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate."' 1 0
These prima facie presumptions have been employed in the area
of criminal infringement in order to supply proof that a valid copyright existed at the time of the alleged infringement"' and to supply evidence of the date of fixation of copyrighted sound
recordings." 2 Presumably, the certificate also serves to provide
other rebuttable evidence in criminal infringement actions, such
was vested in
as the fact that ownership of the copyright infringed
3
someone other than the alleged infringer."
M. NnMMER, supra note 33, § 13.01, at 13-3.
United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943).
17 U.S.C. § 411 (1976).
Id. § 410(c).
See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 576 F.2d 292, 296 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 913 (1978); United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1016-17 (C.D. Cal.
1974), aff'd, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977);
United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
112. United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1040 (1977). See United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1943).
113. The propriety of the government's use of the presumptions arising from the
certificate of copyright registration in criminal infringement cases has been
questioned. See Grumar, supra note 11, at 74-76. Two reasons are posited as
to why such presumptions are out of place in a criminal action. First, by
presuming the facts in the certificate to be true, the court is presuming one of
the elements of the offense-a valid copyright-against the accused, rather
than following the established rule that a criminal defendant is innocent until
proven guilty as to every element of the offense. Second, the use of the registration certificate at trial is hearsay, because it is an out-of-court statement
used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id.
While these are, of course, valid concerns, the courts which have allowed
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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Since this analysis is limited to the situation where an identical
copy of a copyrighted work is made, 114 it may not be too difficult for
the government to prove that the alleged infringer made an unauthorized reproduction. For instance, in the case of sound recordings, most of the reported criminal infringement cases have
involved defendants who were directly involved in both the manu115
facture and distribution of unlawfully produced phonorecords.
Proof of infringement in these116
cases was made by direct evidence
of unauthorized manufacture.
In those instances in which the infringement prosecution is
brought only on the basis of the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works, the government is faced with a much more formidable case. "Implicit in its burden of proof on infringement by
vending is the duty to prove the absence of a first sale as to those
copyrighted articles which the defendant is charged with infringing.'" 1 7 What constitutes a 'Tirst sale" and the difficulties involved
in proving its absence have posed substantial problems for government prosecutors.
Before examining the first sale doctrine in criminal infringement, it is necessary to understand what it represents.
[T] he first sale doctrine provides that where a copyright owner parts with
title to a particular copy of his copyrighted work, he divests himself of his

114.
115.

116.
117.

the introduction of such certificates into evidence in criminal infringement
actions have apparently done so with temperance, clearly noting that the defendant had the opportunity to offer evidence contravening the facts stated in
the certificates. For example, in United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977), a criminal action for record/tape
piracy, the court of appeals stated:
While the certificates are hearsay when offered to prove the truth of
the date thereon, the certificates should be deemed at least prima
facie accurate about the dates of fixation until the contrary appears.
There was no known reason for them to be inaccurate. Appellants
offered no proof, and have suggested no basis for attacking the validity of any particular fixation dates. Absent a concrete showing of
lack of trustworthiness, the admission of the certificates and the attendant instruction was proper.
Id. at 966. See also United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(in the jury instructions, the trial judge noted that certificates of copyright
were placed in evidence by the government to prove the existence of valid
copyrights at the time of the alleged infringement and no proof to the contrary was proffered by the defendant).
See notes 90-96 & accompanying text supra.
See United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
3014 (1980); United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977);
United States v. Blanton, 531 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
935 (1976); United States v. Mallcote, 531 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
See Lindenberg-Woods, -upranote 10, at 82.
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929
(1977).
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exclusive right to vend that particular copy. While the proprietor's other
copyright rights (reprinting, copying, etc.) remain unimpaired, the exclusive right to vend the transferred copy rests with the vendee, who is not
restricted by [the copyright] statute from further transfers1 18of that copy,
even though in breach of an agreement restricting its sale.

If the government can prove that no authorized copies of a copyrighted work have been sold, an irrebuttable presumption is raised
that any copy of that work found in the possession of the accused
was either stolen from the copyright owner or unauthorized. This
may be quite difficult to prove, however, when the copyrighted
work has been the subject of widespread distribution by license.
This was the very problem which faced the Ninth Circuit in three
1977 cases involving copyrighted motion picture infringements." 9
In United States v. Wise, 120 the court partially overturned a
criminal infringement conviction for the vending of feature-length
motion pictures. After outlining the scope and nature of the first
sale doctrine and thoroughly examining the facts, the court found
that the government had not sustained its burden of proving the
absence of a first sale of two of the films allegedly infringed. This
result was reached because those films, although purportedly only
licensed,
1 2 1in effect had been sold to television networks and studio
V.I.P.'s.

The detailed factual analysis of Wise was again employed by
the court of appeals in United States v. Drebin.122 However, in
118. 550 F.2d at 1187 (footnote omitted). If a vendee breaches an agreement not to
sell the transferred copy, he may be liable for the breach, but the sale does
not constitute an infringement. See Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293
F.2d 510, 515-17 (3d Cir. 1961); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691
(2d Cir. 1894).
The first sale doctrine is not of judicial origin but arises from the language
of § 24 of the 1909 copyright laws (currently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976)),
which makes the distinction between the copyright and the material object
embodying the copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
This doctrine is also a factor in civil actions for infringement by vending. See,
e.g., American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978); Platt
& Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963); Fawcett
Publications, Inc. v. Elliott Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
119. Prior to 1977, only two criminal infringement cases were reported that dealt
with the first sale doctrine: United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa.
1975), and United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959). In neither
case did the government meet its burden of proving the absence of a first
sale.
120. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
121. 550 F.2d at 1190-92. Wise also claimed that the sale of worn-out film stock to
film salvage companies constituted a first sale but the court rejected this
claim on the facts before it. Id. at 1192-93. But see Independent News Co. v.
Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F.
689 (2d Cir. 1894).
122. 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978).
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Drebin, which also involved motion picture infringement by vending, the opposite result was reached. Since the court could find no
evidence of a first sale of the allegedly infringed ffilms, 12 3 the convictions for criminal infringement were upheld.
The final case in this Ninth Circuit triad is United States v.
Atherton,124 in which the defendant had bought and sold prints of
motion pictures, and was subsequently convicted of criminal infringement under section 104. On appeal, the Atherton court determined that there were five elements the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt in a section 104 prosecution for infringement by vending: "(1) Infringement of a copyright, (2) of a
work that has not been the subject of a Trst sale,' (3) done willfully, (4) with knowledge that the copyrighted work has not been
the subject of a 'first sale,' and (5) for profit."'125 Atherton's conviction was reversed because the court found the government not
only had failed to prove the absence of a first sale, but also had
failed to prove the necessary scienter element. 126 By adding the
requirement of knowledge on the part of the infringer (that the
copies he is selling have not been subject to a first sale), the court
has limited the scope of criminal liability when the infringing conduct involves only the unauthorized vending of a copyrighted
work. This is a desirable limitation, however, since many retailers
of unauthorized copies of copyrighted works may not possess the
requisite knowledge for criminal liability.
This first sale problem was also specifically addressed in several recent cases involving the infringement of sound recordings
by vending. Upon conviction under section 104, the defendant in
United States v. Whetzel' 27 argued that the government had not
sufficiently proved the absence of a first sale. Whetzel asserted
that the government had not negated the possibility that the
vended eight-track tapes were manufactured and distributed
under sublicenses granted by licensees of the copyright proprietors. Disagreeing with this contention and pointing out that the
defendant was overstating the government's burden, the court
held that the government "was not required to disprove every conceivable scenario in which [the defendant] would be innocent of
infringement."' 28 In this case, the circumstantial evidence that the
123. 557 F.2d at 1326-28. In reaching this determination, the court again conducted
a detailed examination of all license agreements, V.LP. contracts and sales of
film for salvage.
124. 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977).
125. Id. at 749.
126. Id.
127. 589 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
128. Id. at 711.
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tapes vended were unauthorized 12 9 was so overwhelming that the
court stated: "The tapes Whetzel peddled obviously were never
the subject of 'first sale' transactions entered into by copyright
holders or their agents .... ,u30
A similar holding was reached in United States v. Moore, 131
where the defendants were also convicted of criminal infringement
for the distribution of unauthorized sound recordings. Contending
that the government failed to prove the absence of a first sale,
these defendants argued that the government must completely account for the distribution of all authorized phonorecords of the
copyrighted sound recordings to satisfy its burden. Upon reviewing the circumstances of the case and finding "a total absence of
evidence suggesting that the tapes were legitimate,' 1 32 the court
held that "evidence suggesting that the tapes had an illegitimate
origin negates the possibility of a valid first sale as much as proof
from tracing the distribution of the tape to its original source."'133
The Whetzel and Moore decisions appear to remove some of
the "first sale" obstacles that the government faced in earlier cases
involving motion pictures. However, even with this lightened burden, the government apparently must still prove a knowledge on
the part of the accused either that the copies of the copyrighted
work which he is vending were not lawfully manufactured'3 or
that there was no first sale of copies of the copyrighted work which
he is selling.
Forcing the government to trace the origins of the particular
copy of a copyrighted work found in the possession of the accused
may present a virtually impossible task. In the House Report on
the 1976 Copyright Act, there is language to the effect that to require a copyright proprietor to prove that a particular copy of a
copyrighted work in the possession of an alleged infringer was
neither lawfully manufactured nor acquired is an impossible and
129. Whetzel sold the tapes out of a van in a paiking lot, with labels that listed a
manufacturer with a non-existing address and with a price of one dollar per
tape. Id. at 709, 712. The court went so far as to say "there was a complete
absence of anything that would suggest that the tapes were legitimate." Id.
at 712.
130. Id. at 712 n.21 (emphasis added).
131. 604 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 1233.
133. Id. at 1232-33.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Muhammad, [1980] 471 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J.
A-21 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 1979), where the court held that a defendant
charged with criminal copyright infringement as a result of selling "bootleg"
tapes could not use the 'Trst sale" doctrine as a defense and stated- "The
illegality of the tapes makes it unnecessary for the Government to prove the
absence of a first sale."
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unfair burden. 135 These statements were made in response to136a
civil case, American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman,
which held that a civil plaintiff indeed carries such a burden. Consistent with the established legal principle that the burden of proof
should not be placed upon a litigant to establish facts peculiarly
within the knowledge of his adversary, Congress in this House Report expressed its intent that under the 1976 Act, an alleged infringer would bear the burden of proving that the copies of a work
137
in his possession were lawfully manufactured or acquired.
Such a burden may not be unreasonable in a civil case ....

r However, to shift the burden of proof in a criminal infringement case
whereby a defendant must prove a clear chain of title to [copies I in his
possession to avoid being found guilty of a misdemeanor clearly violates
due process. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the prosecution bears the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element
13 8
of an alleged crime.

Although this factor presents no problem when the evidence
clearly indicates the illegality of the copies being vended, the carrying of this burden of proof may still prove troublesome when
such a showing is not so obvious.
2.

Willful Intent

For an infringement to invoke criminal liability under section
506(a), the alleged infringer must have acted "willfully." This element, which has never been a requirement in civil infringement
actions, has been a required aspect of criminal copyright infringement since 1897.139 Since willfulness is a question of intent, direct
proof is rarely available, and its presence will generally be inferred
by examining "the critical facts known by the defendant."' 4 In
is almost always established by circumother words, willfulness
14 1
stantial evidence.
The establishment of this element of criminal infringement
does not appear to have presented too many problems for the
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 41, at 80-81.
400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975), rev'd, 576 F.2d 661(5th Cir. 1978).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 41, at 80-81.
Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 80-81 (footnote omitted). See American
Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 663-64 & 663 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978).
139. Congress first made willfulness an element of criminal infringement in Act of
Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897), which provided that an unauthorized
public performance of a copyrighted dramatic or musical composition, if done
willfully and for profit, was a misdemeanor.
140. United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
3014 (1980). See also United States v. Sherman, 576 F.2d 292, 296-97 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
141. United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. 820, 824-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
135.
136.
137.
138.
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courts. 42 Although commentators have disagreed on whether
"willfully" means an intent to copy, or an intent to infringe, 143 the
courts appear willing to employ the generally "accepted definitions
of willfulness."' 44 For purposes of section 506(a), the element
should be satisfied if the infringer knew the relevant facts concerning the commission of the offense and acted deliberately and
knowingly in infringing a copyright. A mere intent to copy would
145
not be enough.
3. For Purposes of CommercialAdvantage or Private
FinancialGain
For an act to constitute criminal infringement under section
506(a), it must be committed "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain." This aspect of criminal copyright
infringement superficially serves to distinguish it from civil infringement. In most cases, the fact that an infringement was done
for commercial or private gain is not something a copyright proprietor must prove in a civil infringement action. However, there are
instances under the 1976 Copyright Act when such a showing may
be necessary to obtain a civil judgment of infringement. 1 6 In fact,
142. See, e.g., United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1137-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3014 (1980); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1194-95 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533,
535 (2d Cir. 1943).
143. Compare M. NnMMER, supra note 33, § 15.01, at 15-3 n.13, with Grumar, supra
note 11, at 70-71. For further discussion on the requirement of willfulness in
criminal copyright infringement, see Gawthrop, supra note 5, at 164-65;
Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 72-73; Wicher, supra note 5, at 396.
144. United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
3014 (1980). In this case, which involved a criminal copyright conviction
under § 104, the court of appeals looked to the United States Supreme Court
for guidance in ascertaining the "accepted" definition of willful intent. The
court adopted the definition of "willful" used in United States v. Murdock, 290
U.S. 389 (1933), as the standard for criminal infringement:
The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a
criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose
stubbornly, obstinately, per... without justifiable excuse ...
versely.... The word is also employed to characterize a thing done
without ground for believing it is lawful . . or conduct marked by
careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act.
Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted). See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 31(4) (1961).
145. Under this approach, an innocent infringer (one who did not know that the
work being copied was copyrighted) would never be criminally liable for
copyright infringement. '"Thus the omission of a copyright notice on [authorized] copies of the copyrighted work would seem to negate the 'knowing' intent required for criminal liability." Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 72.
146. The commercial/non-commercial use of a copyrighted work may play a critical role in determining whether a particular use of a work is a fair use or falls
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instances may arise where a profitable purpose is a required eleliability, but no finding of criminal liament for civil infringement
147
bility may be possible.
Ascertainment of the purpose of an alleged infringer's conduct
as in a determination of willfulness is an attempt to determine that
person's state of mind and the result generally hinges on circumstantial evidence. 148 This element of criminal infringement should
not ordinarily pose much difficulty to government prosecutors,
however, since the types of infringing conduct most suited to the
imposition of criminal liability (large-scale commercial piracy op49
erations) are obviously entered into for profitable purposes.1
These operations, where there is a direct commercial advantage or
private financial gain, are "the kinds of flagrant and economically
harmful types of infringement for which criminal penalties should
be imposed."' 5 0 Prosecutors should exercise discretion in the
bringing of actions under section 506(a), pursuing for the most
part, only large-scale commercial infringers who realize a direct
financial advantage from their conduct. The sanctions of criminal
infringement should be imposed in a situation of indirect commercial advantage only when the possible civil remedies have been

147.

148.
149.
150.

within the infringement exemption sections of the copyright law. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1976) (fair use exemption); id. § 108(a) (1) (library exemption);
id. § 110 (1) (education exemption); id § 110 (2) (educational transmission exemption); id. § 110(5) (commercial establishment exemption); id. § 110(9)
(transmission for handicapped exemption); id. § 111(a) (1) (hotel/apartment
house relay exemption); id. § 116(a), (e) (1) (B) (juke-box exemption); id.
§ 118 (public broadcast entity exemption). Except for fair use, a direct or
indirect commercial advantage will automatically result in the loss of an exemption and present the possibility of civil and criminal infringement liability.
Discussing the "for profit" aspect in the civil and criminal contexts under
§ 104 of the 1909 copyright laws, one commentator noted:
In civil cases it is irrelevant that the gain may be only an indirect
result of the infringement. But criminal statutes are subject to the
dual principles of strict construction and mens rea, and these would
operate to narrow the scope of the profit requirement when applied
Consequently, the profit in a criminal into criminal cases ....
fringement apparently must inure to the defendant as a more direct
result of the infringement than would suffice for a civil case, so as to
make the defendant aware that he is profiting, and to make it quite
clear that it involves the type of commercial activity which the statute was designed to prohibit.
Grumar, supra note 11, at 72 (footnote omitted). This narrowing of criminal
liability may have been the case under the "for profit" language of § 104, but
with the new "for the purpose of" language of § 506(a), criminal liability may
have been broadened. See notes 42-45 & accompanying text supra.
United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. 820, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
929 (1977).
See Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 72.
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completely exhausted in attempts to obtain infringement relief.151
B.

Effect of a Criminal Infringement Conviction in a Subsequent Civil

Suit
Since both criminal and civil liability may arise from the same
conduct, once a criminal infringement conviction has been obtained, may any portion of that finding be employed by the copyright proprietor to obtain a civil judgment against the convicted
infringer? There have been no reported copyright cases that discuss this question,5 2 but it appears that the principles of collateral
estoppel could be effectively employed in a subsequent civil infringement action in order to give conclusive effect to common is15 3
sues previously litigated in the criminal case.
In its traditional sense, collateral estoppel simply means that
"when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit."'1 54 The underlying
purpose of collateral estoppel is to preclude repeated controversy
over matters judicially determined; it is a "reasonable measure calculated to save individuals and courts from the waste and burden
of relitigating old issues. 15 5 This concept, sometimes more precisely termed "issue preclusion,' 56 does not act to prevent inquiry
151. Id.
152. But see Lees, Psst: Get Your Hot Glen Campbell TapesHere, N.Y. Times, Dec.
1, 1974, § 2, at 21, col. 1. This New York Times article reported the initial decision in United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), affid, 540 F.2d
961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977), and noted that civil suits
were filed by the recording companies whose albums had been pirated.
153. It does not follow that the reverse is true, however. Because of the differing
standards of proof, an issue determined in a civil action is not precluded from
relitigation in a later criminal prosecution.
The collateral estoppel effect of criminal convictions has sometimes been
confused with the question of admissibility under a hearsay exception of
prior judgments of conviction as rebuttable evidence of issues previously adjudicated. R. CASAD, RES JUDICATA § 5-73, at 257 (1978). Cf., e.g., FED. R. EviD.
803(22) (admissibility of evidence of previous felony conviction); note 158 infra (statutory rule in antitrust instances).
154. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). This traditional view, which requires identity of parties in both actions, has been broadened so thit it is
available to the copyright proprietor in a situation such as discussed herein.
See notes 159-70 & accompanying text infra.
155. Tillman v. National City Bank of New York, 118 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 650 (1941).
156. F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAzARD, JR., CIVI PROCEDURE § 11.16 (2d ed. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). See
also R. CAsAD, supra note 153, § 5-1, at 123:
Basically, the rule of issue preclusion is as follows: An issue essential to the judgment rendered, which was actually litigated and
determined by a court having jurisdiction of subject matter and over

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:114

into matters that may not have been placed in issue and determined in the prior action.
1.

General Requirementsfor CollateralEstoppel Effect

Before any determination made in a former action can be given
collateral estoppel effect, there are at least four elements which
must be satisfied: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the
same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue must have
been actually litigated; (3) that issue must have been determined
by a valid and final judgment; and (4) the determination must have
been essential to the prior judgment. 157 If these conditions are
is precluded from a reexamination
met, then the issue in question
58
in a subsequent action.
2.

TraditionalDifficulties in Invoking CollateralEstoppel
from Criminal to Civil Actions

Two factors may serve to limit the use of the collateral estoppel
effect of a criminal conviction in a later civil suit, even where the
issues in question are identical. One is the doctrine of mutuality;
the other is the different standard of proof required in criminal as
opposed to civil proceedings.
a.

The Doctrine of Mutuality

The doctrine of mutuality, now on the wane, essentially required identity of parties for the application of collateral estoppel.
If the second action involved different parties, then an issue decided in the earlier action is not precluded from consideration in
the second action, even if one of the parties had been a party in the
first action and had unsuccessfully litigated the issue in question
the person of the parties, may not be relitigated by the same parties
or those in privity with them.
157. See F. JAMEs, JR. & G. HAzARD, JR., supra note 156, §§ 11.16-.19; lB MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.443[1] (2d ed. 1974).

158. Cf. note 153 supra (not possible to preclude issues from civil to criminal actions).
There is one instance, the area of antitrust litigation, where the fulfilling of
these conditions results in a different effect. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976)) provides that a prior judgment adverse to the defendant in any civil or criminal antitrust proceeding brought by or on behalf
of the United States shall only have prima facie evidentiary effect in subsequent private suits against the same defendant. Consequently, a beleaguered defendant may still offer evidence to rebut findings in the prior action,
conduct which would not be possible if those findings were given conclusive
effect. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961);
Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680, 681-83 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 168 (1979); Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE UJ. 541 (1976).
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on that occasion. 159 The mutuality doctrine had gained nearly universal acceptance until it was initially repudiated in 1942 in the
leading case of Bernhard v. Bank of America.160 The California
Supreme Court in Bernhard, developed a formula, known as the
Bernhardrule, for determining whether a prior decision would be
given collateral estoppel effect: "Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party
againstwhom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?"'61
Although many jurisdictions adopted the Bernhard rule, the
United States Supreme Court did not follow suit until 1971. In a
civil patent infringement action, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation,162 the Court held that the
holder of a patent, who had lost a prior action to enforce the patent
on the ground that the patent was invalid, was bound by the determination of invalidity in a subsequent action against another alleged infringer. 163 As a result of this ruling, the Bernhard rule
gained still greater acceptance, and was ultimately adopted in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments.164
The demise of the doctrine of mutuality still left some question
as to whether issue preclusion could be invoked "offensively," i.e.,
where a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating issues
which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another
plaintiff.165 The Supreme Court recently addressed this question
in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,166 in which a plaintiff in a civil
action sought to preclude the defendant from relitigating issues
which the defendant had unsuccessfully litigated in a prior civil
action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In
accord with the trend of recent authority to the effect that there is
no intrinsic difference between "offensive" and "defensive" issue
preclusion, 67 the Court held that "the preferable approach for
dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial
68
courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.'
F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JrL, supra note 156, § 1124,at 578.
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added).
402 U.S. 313 (1971).
Id. at 349-50.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

165. See id. § 88, at 99, Reporter's Note.
166. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
167. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 at 99, Reporter's Note (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1975).
168. 439 U.S. at 331.
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The Court noted that in exercising such discretion, a trial court
should not allow offensive issue preclusion where the plaintiff
could easily have joined the earlier action or where its application
would be unfair to the defendant.169 Since both of these qualifications on the use of offensive issue preclusion would be satisfied,
the doctrine of mutuality should no longer present an obstruction
to the application of collateral estoppel against a convicted copyright infringer in170a subsequent civil action brought by the copyright proprietor.
b.

Differing Standardsof Proof

While the differences in burden of proof between civil and criminal actions may limit the collateral estoppel effect of certain judgments 17 1 in a former criminal action, a judgment of conviction is
generally held to be conclusive in a later civil action. The accepted
rule is that because a defendant is surrounded by greater safeguards in criminal rather than civil litigation, and because the
standard of proof to which the complainant is held is much higher,
a judgment of conviction is conclusive in civil litigation between
the defendant and the party whose rights he was convicted of in169. Id. at 329-33.
170. A private party certainly cannot join the government in a criminal action, and
with the higher burden of proof and other attendant safeguards in criminal
proceedings, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which such an application of offensive issue preclusion in a subsequent civil action would be unfair
to the defendant, although such a situation may undoubtedly arise. See generally id. at 330-31.
171. If the prior criminal prosecution resulted in an acquittal, that action concludes no issues of civil liability in favor of the defendant because a failure to
show criminal liability beyond a reasonable doubt does not preclude the possibility that civil liability can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
1B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[1], at 2703-04 (2d ed. 1980); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,65 HAv. L. REV. 818, 879 (1952). A criminal
judgment may also fail to receive full collateral estoppel effect when the defendant has pled guilty or nolo contendere. See 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACricE 0.41811], at 2706-08 (2d ed. 1980).
In addition, it was once believed that the form of the verdict in a criminal
conviction was a factor in determining the collateral estoppel effect in a later
civil action. That position is no longer favored:
[T)he working of an estoppel in a subsequent civil proceeding is not
frustrated by the fact that the prior criminal conviction was in the
form of a general jury verdict. It is the task of the trial judge in the
subsequent civil proceeding to determine through an examination of
the pleadings, court opinions if any, and the record of the criminal
trial which questions were "'distinctly put in issue and directly determined" in the criminal prosecution.'
SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(quoting Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569
(1951)).

1981]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

vading as applied to issues that were litigated and adjudicated in
the criminal prosecution. 172 The only obstacles to giving collateral
estoppel effect to a conviction in a later civil action would seem to
be those applying to issue preclusion generally. 7 3
3.

CollateralEstoppel and Copyright

Much has been written about the concept of collateral estoppel,
but it has not heretofore been considered in the context of federal
copyright law. Naturally, to preclude an issue in a later action by
collateral estoppel, all of the usual conditions must be fulfilled. 174
In the case of a civil infringement action brought by a copyright
proprietor against a defendant previously convicted of infringing
the proprietor's copyrights, the conditions would appear to be satisfied. The issue sought to be precluded-the occurrence of an infringement-has already been litigated and determined in a valid,
final judgment, 175 and that issue was certainly essential to the
prior criminal action. The differences in standards of proof and
moving parties in the two actions do not act to diminish the effect
of such an application of collateral estoppel.
As a matter of law, a conviction under section 506(a) must include those elements necessary to make out a civil judgment
against an infringer because "criminal copyright infringement incorporates as one of its elements the concept of civil copyright infringement.' u 76 In addition to proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that there was an infringement, the government in a section 506(a)
prosecution is also required to prove several additional elements
to establish criminal liability, e.g., that the infringement was willful and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain. 17 7 The application of issue preclusion, in this instance to
make out a conclusive case of civil infringement, achieves the kind
of result desired by the policies underlying collateral estoppel;
granting conclusive effect to the finding of an infringement in a
prior 506(a) action avoids the waste and burden of relitigating issues which have already been sufficiently determined.
172. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[1], at 2703 (2d ed. 1980).
173. R. CASAD, supra note 153, § 5-73, at 257. See, e.g., notes 182-86 & accompanying
text infra.
174. See text accompanying note 157 supra.
175. But see note 182 & accompanying text infra.
176. United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
177. See notes 139-51 & accompanying text supra.
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4. Difficulties in Invoking CollateralEstoppel in Copyright
a.

Shifting Burdens

A conviction of criminal infringement under section 506(a) is a
situation perfectly suited to the use of issue preclusion by the aggrieved copyright proprietor. The only obstacle peculiar to copyright law that could possibly prevent a complete preclusion of the
infringement issue in a subsequent civil action is a possible shifting of the burden of proof respecting the origin of the infringer's
178
copies.
In a section 506(a) prosecution, the government generally has
shown that the defendant's copies are unauthorized by proving either unauthorized manufacture, the absence of a first sale, or the
existence of circumstantial evidence which shows the obvious illegality of the copies beyond a reasonable doubt. 17 9 The government
is required to make such proof because of due process considerations-the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the essential elements of an alleged crime. 80 In the House Report on the
1976 Copyright Act, however, Congress expressed its intent that in
civil infringement actions the alleged infringer should bear the
burden of proving that copies of a copyrighted work in his possession were lawfully manufactured or acquired.' 8' This was an attempt by Congress to ease the burden on copyright proprietors
who had faced substantial difficulties proving the illegality of the
defendant's copies in civil infringement actions.
If this congressional intent and due process are both strictly adhered to, the effect will be a "shifting" of the burden of proof from
the prosecution in the criminal action to the defendant in a subsequent civil suit. While this burden change may appear to be a concern, it should have little practical impact on the application of
collateral estoppel in this instance. The defendant should be precluded from raising a first sale defense in a civil action if he has
already suffered an adverse determination on that issue beyond a
reasonable doubt in the criminal proceeding. To allow this shift in
burden to prevent the complete preclusion of the infringement issue would be a rather peculiar result, since both the application of
collateral estoppel and Congress' stated intent purportedly benefit
the copyright proprietor.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See notes 135-38 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 114-38 & accompanying text supra.
See Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 80-81.
HousE REPORT, supra note 41, at 80-81.
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b.

The Unpredictabilityof CollateralEstoppel
Application

As issue preclusion and the Bernhard rule became refined
through experience and application, a two-step process of factual
determination evolved:
The first inquiry is whether the person against whom preclusion is to be
applied had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action-an opportunity at least equivalent to that which he would have in
the second action. If it appears that he did have such an opportunity, issue preclusion presumptively applies-that is, the party against whom the
issue was resolved cannot relitigate the issue
182 unless he can show a good
reason why he should be enabled to do so.

The reasons that may justify relitigation are several, and have
183
been catalogued by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.
For example, if the prior determination is of dubious reliability (inconsistent with another determination of the same issue, affected
by relationships between the parties, etc.) or if treating the issue
as conclusive would prejudice another party involved in the second action, the defendant may deserve an opportunity to relitigate
that particular issue. This Restatement list is not meant to be exclusive. In fact, the final clause states the broad rule that "other
compelling circumstances"184may also justify allowing a party to relitigate a particular issue.
Because of these exceptions, the effect of collateral estoppel in
copyright as well as any other area of law, is not as ironclad as it
may first appear. These exceptions give the application of issue
preclusion "a substantial degree of flexibility, [and] the question
of preclusion now depends to an important degree on 'sound judicial discretion.' "185 The resulting unpredictability of an attempt at
issue preclusion invokes an inherent uncertainty among lawyers
1 86
as to whether it should even be relied upon in a particular case.
Nevertheless, from the copyright proprietor's point of view, a rejection of issue preclusion by the court is not a great setback. The
proprietor still has an opportunity to prove civil infringement-the
task is merely made a bit more burdensome.
182. F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, J.,

supra note 156, § 11.25, at 583 (emphasis ad-

ded).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(l)-(8), Appendix (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1976). See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(8), Appendix (Tent. Draft No. 3,

1976).
185. F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAzARD, J., supra note 156, § 11.25, at 583. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
186. F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 156, § 11.25, at 583-84.
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c. Statute of Limitations
All infringement actions are subject to the provisions of section
507 of the Copyright Act, 187 which establishes a three-year statute
of limitations for both criminal proceedings and civil actions. 188
Since the limitation periods for both criminal and civil actions presumably begin to run at the same time, a copyright proprietor
awaiting the outcome of a criminal prosecution prior to pursuing
civil remedies should at least ifie his case with the proper court so
as to preserve his right to bring suit. If he waits for a final judgment in the criminal proceeding, he may find himself without civil
recourse by operation of section 507.189
V. CONCLUSION
"The bite of law is in its enforcement."' 9 0 These words, written
in 1946 by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme
Court, typify the historical role of criminal infringement in the federal copyright scheme. For many years, the criminal infringement
sanctions were ineffective even when enforced, but in the 1970's,
the modernization of the criminal infringement provisions by Congress has opened the door for meaningful prosecutions. This is not
to imply that the government should prosecute every infringer
who satisfies the section 506(a) criteria. The criminal infringement
187. 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1976).
188.
(a) Criminal Proceedings
No criminal proceeding shall be maintained under the provisions
of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the cause
of action arose.
(b) Civil Actions
No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this
title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.
Id. The language of this provision, adopted in 1957, was not altered in the
general revision. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 41, at 164.
189. Although not peculiar to copyright law, an additional concern to the copyright
proprietor when bringing a civil suit for damages against a convicted infringer is the possibility that the defendant will be judgment-proof. Of
course, this problem does not affect the mechanical aspects of the application
of collateral estoppel and although it is merely a practical concern, the
financial status of a convicted infringer should certainly be considered before
civil remedies are pursued. Presumably, the defendant has just been
through the rigors of an unsuccessful criminal defense, including possible appeals, which is not an inexpensive undertaking. In addition, the conviction
probably resulted in the levying of fines against the defendant, a further
drain on his financial well-being. It should also be noted that large-scale commercial infringement operations are not limited to those with a great deal of
capital. In 1979, one recording industry source estimated the costs of going
into business as a tape pirate at less than $10,000. S. SHEMEL & M. KRAsimoVSKY, supra note 76, at 93.
190. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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provisions should only be utilized when the infringing conduct is
of such magnitude as to substantially encroach upon the artistic
and economic rights of a copyright proprietor. In other words, government attorneys should exercise their discretionary powers of
prosecution and pursue only those large-scale commercial infringement operations .which are able to produce and distribute
large quantities of unauthorized copies. 191 Prosecutors must Unlit
themselves to pursuing only those infringers engaged in such activities. "Criminal infringement must not, even to the slightest degree, chill the right of authors and artists to freely borrow ideas
1 92
and learn from the works of others.'
Many of the relationships between the criminal and civil copyright infringement provisions have yet to be tested. However,
bringing these two areas of law together by applying the principles
of collateral estoppel appears to be quite proper, and will make a
civil action that much easier for the maltreated copyright proprietor.193
James Lincoln Young '81

191. Besides violating federal copyright laws, those engaged in and associated
with large-scale commercial infringement operations may also be liable for
other federal offenses. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (conspiracy to commit any
offense against the United States); id. §§ 1961-1968 (Supp. 1980) (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); id. § 2318 (1976) (transportation,
sale or receipt of phonorecords bearing forged or counterfeited labels).
192. Lindenberg-Woods, supra note 10, at 87.
193. Cf Gawthrop, supra note 5, at 169 (for criminal infringement to be effective
and useful, its benefits must be more directed to the copyright proprietor).

